‘WE NEVER INTENDED THIS’: AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DIPLOMACY AND THE OCCUPATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (1875–1878)

Abstract

Тhe approach of Gyula Andrássy, particularly during the period (1875–1878) regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, aligned with the views he expressed during the often-highlighted conference chaired by the Emperor Franz Joseph on 29 January 1875. Consistent with his broader perspective on resolving the future of the Balkans, Andrássy, largely maintained control over the basic directions of foreign policy throughout the Great Eastern Crisis (1875–1878), His actions were supported by Emperor Franz Joseph, with one notable exception: the Habsburg monarch prevented Andrássy from leading the country toward mobilization and a potential war with Russia following the Russian-Ottoman Peace agreement of San Stefano. The perception of Andrássy’s policy as contradictory and confusing to both his contemporaries and later researchers stems from the intersection of two fundamental developments he faced. On one hand, there were the dynamics of mutual relations within the concert of European Great Powers and Austria-Hungary’s role within it. On the other hand, when viewed from the perspective of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the issue of Austria-Hungary’s territorial expansion—specifically the occupation or annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—presented the first real challenge for the reorganized Dual Monarchy. This was particularly significant in terms of decision-making on the incorporation of new territories.